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Saving Federal Settlement Privilege after
Actavis
Annie Gowen†
INTRODUCTION
A reverse-payment agreement, also known as a “pay-for-delay”
agreement, is a type of patent settlement in which a brand-name
drug manufacturer pays a prospective generic manufacturer not
to challenge the brand-name manufacturer’s patent. These settlements are relatively common,1 but they are also controversial because they can enable the brand-name manufacturer to maintain
monopoly power over an invalid patent, which leaves consumers
paying too-high prices for too-small quantities of the drug. In the
2013 case FTC v Actavis, Inc,2 the Supreme Court held that these
settlements are subject to antitrust scrutiny because of their potential to artificially extend the monopoly power conferred by a
patent.3 This Comment explores whether and how federal settlement privilege—which, in several jurisdictions, shields from discovery in future lawsuits any communications that parties make
in the course of reaching a settlement—applies in antitrust litigation concerning reverse-payment agreements.
Because Actavis held that the anticompetitive harm of reverse payments stems from the settling parties’ attempts “to prevent the risk of competition,”4 courts hearing reverse-payment
cases must examine parties’ reasons for settling to determine liability: “If the basic reason is a desire to maintain and to share
patent-generated monopoly profits, then, in the absence of some
† BA 2013, Creighton University; JD Candidate 2017, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1
In fiscal year 2014 (the most recent year for which data is available), American
pharmaceutical companies entered into twenty-one reverse-payment settlements, which
accounted for 13 percent of all patent settlements between brand-name and generic manufacturers. The combined value of these settlements exceeded $6 billion. See Agreements
Filed with the Federal Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Overview of Agreements Filed in FY 2014; A Report
by the Bureau of Competition *1, 4, archived at http://perma.cc/BP8K-AB3N.
2
133 S Ct 2223 (2013).
3
Id at 2227.
4
Id at 2236.
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other justification, the antitrust laws are likely to forbid the arrangement.”5 But if settlement is motivated by “traditional [ ] considerations,” such as a desire to avoid litigation costs or to compensate the generic manufacturer for services that it has agreed
to perform, the settlement will not be found anticompetitive.6
Now that courts presiding over reverse-payment cases must
consider the motivations of the manufacturers who entered the
settlement agreement, it is crucial to know whether and to what
extent communications made in furtherance of reverse-payment
settlements are protected by settlement privilege. This Comment
proposes an answer to that question.
Part I of this Comment explains the origins of reverse payments and why these agreements are uniquely attractive to drug
manufacturers. It concludes by discussing the Actavis opinion and
the current legal status of reverse-payment agreements, paying
special attention to the implications that Actavis has for those
courts that recognize settlement privilege. Part II explains what
settlement privilege is and why some federal courts—but not others—have decided to recognize the privilege. Part III examines
the evidentiary dilemma faced by courts that must scrutinize reverse payments under the constraints of settlement privilege.
Most importantly, Part III suggests two ways in which courts that
recognize settlement privilege can reconcile that privilege with
the mandate of Actavis. Part III.A explores how the crime-fraud
doctrine, according to which no privilege attaches to communications undertaken in furtherance of crime or fraud, could provide
a work-around to settlement privilege in many reverse-payment
cases, but also describes the difficulties inherent in such an approach. Part III.B then offers an alternative solution: instead of
relying on the complex, obstacle-laden crime-fraud doctrine,
courts can invoke the common-law “necessity exception” to confine settlement privilege so that it does not apply in lawsuits, such
as reverse-payment suits, in which the legality of the settlement
itself is at issue. Careful application of either the crime-fraud doctrine or, more promisingly, the necessity exception would allow
courts to adjudicate reverse-payment cases without abandoning
settlement privilege altogether.

5
6

Id at 2237.
Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236.
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I. REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS AND ACTAVIS
A reverse-payment agreement—also called a “pay-for-delay”
agreement—is a type of patent settlement in which a patent
holder pays a prospective rival to settle patent challenges.7 From
their inception, the legal status of these agreements has been controversial. By giving patent holders the power to stifle challenges
to their monopoly power, reverse payments strain the tension between patent law, which grants innovators monopoly rights over
their creations, and antitrust law, which seeks to eradicate monopolies and similar restraints on trade.8
This Part explores this tension and its legal implications.
Part I.A provides an overview of the regulatory framework that
has made reverse-payment agreements uniquely popular in the
pharmaceutical industry. Part I.B discusses the legal controversy
surrounding these agreements, eventually turning to the Supreme
Court’s resolution of that controversy in Actavis. Finally, Part I.C
outlines some important questions that remain unanswered in the
wake of Actavis. These questions directly bear on whether and to
what extent communications made in furtherance of reversepayment settlements are protected by settlement privilege.
A.

Background and Regulatory Framework

For reasons discussed in this Section, reverse-payment
agreements are especially—if not uniquely9—attractive to pharmaceutical manufacturers. Pharmaceutical drugs are one of the
many types of “composition[s] of matter” eligible for protection
under US patent law.10 The creator of a drug whose patent is approved by the US Patent and Trademark Office receives the exclusive right to manufacture and sell that drug for a twenty-year
term.11 This monopoly term is widely considered to be a necessary
incentive for drug manufacturers: without some period of exclusivity during which the manufacturer can charge above-market
7
Einer Elhauge and Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 Tex L
Rev 283, 284 & n 1 (2012).
8
For a discussion of this tension and its implications, see generally E. Thomas
Sullivan, The Confluence of Antitrust and Intellectual Property at the New Century, 1
Minn Intel Prop Rev 1 (2000).
9
See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2227 (“Apparently most if not all reverse payment settlement agreements arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug regulation.”).
10 35 USC § 101. See also Michael Enzo Furrow, Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle
Management after KSR v. Teleflex, 63 Food & Drug L J 275, 289 (2008) (noting that drug
patents are often filed as compositions of matter).
11 35 USC §§ 154(a)(2), 271(a).
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prices and reap monopoly profits, many drug manufacturers
would not be able to recover their research and development
costs.12
In addition to obtaining a patent for its new drug, the manufacturer must obtain approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in order to legally market that drug.13 The Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,14
commonly known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act,”15 outlines the process by which pharmaceutical companies gain FDA approval to
bring a drug to market.16
The Hatch-Waxman Act also prescribes procedures designed
to resolve patent disputes between brand-name and generic drug
manufacturers. A manufacturer seeking to market a new drug
must submit a New Drug Application17 (NDA) providing details
about the drug’s composition and “full reports of investigations
which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe
for use and whether such drug is effective in use.”18 This clinical
testing and approval process is long, arduous, and extremely expensive.19 The manufacturer also provides “the patent number
and the expiration date of any patent” that a generic manufacturer would infringe by manufacturing the drug.20 The upshot of
this process for the applicant is that, if the FDA approves the
NDA, it publishes the drug and patent information in a book
called “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations,”21 nicknamed the “Orange Book.”22

12 See Wendy H. Schacht and John R. Thomas, Patent Law and Its Application to the
Pharmaceutical Industry: An Examination of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 (“The Hatch-Waxman Act”) *2–5 (Congressional Research Service,
Jan 10, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/E3SR-KPW9.
13 See 21 USC § 355(a).
14 Pub L No 98-417, 98 Stat 1585.
15 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2228.
16 See 21 USC § 355(b), (j).
17 See 21 CFR § 314.50.
18 21 USC § 355(b)(1).
19 See Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen, and Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J Health Econ 151, 161–66
(2003) (estimating that the costs of NDA clinical testing constitute half the cost of drug
development and that the average successful drug costs $282 million to develop).
20 21 USC § 355(b)(1).
21 See 21 USC § 355(j)(7)(A).
22 See Julie Dohm, Comment, Expanding the Scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s Patent Carve-Out Exception to the Identical Drug Labeling Requirement: Closing the Patent
Litigation Loophole, 156 U Pa L Rev 151, 152 n 2 (2007) (describing the Orange Book).
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A quicker and simpler method of approval is available to prospective generic manufacturers of drugs listed in the Orange
Book. A generic drug manufacturer need file only an Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA),23 which incorporates the safety
and effectiveness findings of the previously approved brand-name
drug. This method allows the generic manufacturer “to piggyback
on” the research and testing of the original manufacturer and
thereby gain FDA approval so long as it can prove that the generic
drug is chemically identical to the original.24
However, the ANDA applicant must certify to the FDA that
its generic drug will not infringe the original manufacturer’s patent. There are several ways in which an ANDA applicant can
make this certification. Commonly, the applicant will certify that
the original patent has expired or will expire before the generic
goes to market.25 Alternatively, the applicant can assert that the
original manufacturer’s “patent is invalid or will not be infringed
by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the
application is submitted.”26 This latter filing is called a “[P]aragraph IV certification.”27
If the generic applicant files a Paragraph IV certification, it
must notify the patent holder that it is challenging the validity of
the patent.28 The notification must “include a detailed statement
of the factual and legal basis” for the generic’s belief that the patent is invalid.29 The patent holder then has forty-five days to sue
the ANDA applicant for infringement.30 If the patent holder does
not sue, then the FDA proceeds with the approval process for the
generic drug.31 But if the patent holder files a timely suit, the FDA
stays approval for thirty months.32 If, during the stay, a court determines that the patent is invalid, the FDA’s approval of the
ANDA becomes effective on the date the court enters judgment.33
Because a Paragraph IV certification amounts to constructive infringement34 and usually challenges the validity of an extremely
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

See 21 USC § 355(j).
Valley Drug Co v Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 344 F3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir 2003).
21 USC § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(II)–(III).
21 USC § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
Valley Drug, 344 F3d at 1297.
See 21 USC § 355(j)(2)(B).
21 USC § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II).
21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)(aa).
35 USC § 271(e)(2)(A).
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valuable patent, it almost always triggers litigation by the brandname manufacturer to defend its patent.35 If the generic manufacturer wins at trial, then it and other generic firms are allowed to
enter the market. The competition among multiple generic manufacturers rapidly drives down the price of the drug, effectively
transferring millions or billions of dollars in potential monopoly
profits from the brand-name manufacturer to consumers.36
However, because Paragraph IV litigation can be extremely
expensive, a prospective generic filer faces first-mover disadvantages in bringing its patent challenge. The Paragraph IV
filer’s lawsuit, if successful, enables other generic firms to free
ride on its legal efforts. These competing generics can enjoy the
benefits of the patent challenge (namely, market entry) without
having to incur the costs and risks of the lawsuit. The presence of
free riders who can immediately enter the market and drive down
the price of the drug seriously reduces the incentive of generic
firms to challenge patents in the first place.37
This is where the unique regulatory provisions of the HatchWaxman Act kick in. The Hatch-Waxman Act gives generic manufacturers a powerful incentive to incur the heavy litigation costs
of a Paragraph IV suit: it grants the first successful Paragraph IV
filer a minimonopoly—a 180-day period during which only it may
legally manufacture a generic version of the challenged drug.38
Importantly, the first “successful” filer is the first generic firm to
file an approved Paragraph IV certification, not the first firm to
actually win a patent challenge.39 Thus, even if the first filer loses
or settles an infringement lawsuit, subsequent generic firms do
not become eligible for the 180-day exclusivity period.40

35 Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd v Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S Ct 1670,
1677 (2012) (“Filing a paragraph IV certification means provoking litigation.”).
36 See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 NYU L Rev 1553, 1557, 1564–67 (2006).
37 See id at 1605 (“[P]otential challengers [ ] face a serious free-rider problem. Not
only will a firm fail to internalize the full benefits of its challenge, . . . but in addition the
gains will tend to be rapidly dissipated, as other firms enter and compete away the benefits
of the favorable judgment.”).
38 See 21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
39 See 21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb), (D)(iii).
40 See 21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). See also Hemphill, 81 NYU L Rev at 1583–86 (cited
in note 36) (explaining why this is the correct interpretation of § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)); Arkansas
Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v Bayer AG, 604 F3d 98, 101 & n 4 (2d Cir 2010)
(citing the Hemphill article and acknowledging that that the court had erred as a matter
of law when it wrote, in an earlier case, “that the exclusivity period cedes to the first ANDA
filer to successfully defend”) (emphasis added).
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The 180-day exclusivity period begins to run, if it runs at all,
as soon as the first ANDA applicant commercially markets its
drug.41 Because the price of a drug—and, hence, manufacturers’
opportunity for profit—rapidly declines as additional competing
generic manufacturers enter the market, the exclusivity period
can be extremely valuable, often worth hundreds of millions of
dollars.42 Without the exclusivity guarantee, generic manufacturers often have little incentive to challenge the brand-name manufacturer’s patent in the first place.43
As is the case with most lawsuits, legal challenges brought
by brand-name manufacturers in response to Paragraph IV filings are often settled by the parties in a private agreement, rather
than by a court at trial.44 When these settlement agreements involve cash consideration, they are described as involving “reverse” payments because, “rather than demanding damages in
settlement the brand manufacturer pays a sum of money—often
a very large sum of money—to the generic manufacturer.”45 This
flips the usual settlement scenario, in which the alleged infringer
pays the alleged victim, to one in which the victim pays the alleged infringer.
Under ordinary circumstances in a competitive market, a
high-value reverse payment would trigger additional patent challenges, because it signals to other potential generic manufacturers that the patent holder either doubts the validity of its patent
or is sufficiently risk-averse that it is willing to settle on terms
that are highly attractive to generic challengers.46 The threat of
inviting additional litigation would discourage patentees from entering high-value reverse payments in the first place. And, in any
case, the onslaught of future challenges would make it difficult or
impossible for a patentee to “buy off” all of its generic challengers.
41 21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). If the validity of the patent is fully litigated, the 180-day
exclusivity period begins to run as soon as the court issues a final order that the patent is
invalid or not infringed. 21 CFR § 314.107(c)(1).
42 Hemphill, 81 NYU L Rev at 1579 (cited in note 36).
43 See id.
44 See Overview of Agreements Filed in FY 2014 at *4 (cited in note 1) (citing data
indicating that potential reverse-payment settlements involving “first filers”—in other
words, Paragraph IV settlements—accounted for 7 percent to 23 percent of all patent settlements between generic and brand-name manufacturers in each year from 2010 to 2014).
45 Joshua P. Davis, Applying Litigation Economics to Patent Settlements: Why Reverse Payments Should Be Per Se Illegal, 41 Rutgers L J 255, 257 (2009).
46 See, for example, Hemphill, 81 NYU L Rev at 1582 (cited in note 36) (noting that
the Hatch-Waxman Act alters the normal presumption that “there are many potential
challengers, and paying one merely attracts others”).
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But these assumptions do not hold under the terms of the HatchWaxman Act. Because only the first generic challenger is eligible
for the Act’s 180-day exclusivity period—and because, without
this exclusivity period, the expected costs of litigation would
likely often exceed the expected gains from a lawsuit47—a brandname manufacturer can often effectively protect a patent, even a
likely invalid one, by “buying off” the first challenger.
B.

Legal Controversy and Actavis

Federal antitrust enforcers were wary of reverse-payment
settlements from the beginning, because of their potential to
harm consumers by keeping prices artificially high and supply artificially low. The legal controversy surrounding reverse payments came to a head in the early 2000s, when the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) began challenging these agreements as anticompetitive—and thus illegal48—restraints of trade.49 The FTC
argued that these agreements implicate antitrust issues because
a patent has no exclusionary potential—and thus confers no legitimate monopoly rights—if its holder would not win the underlying infringement suit.50 According to the FTC, because it is usually impossible to know in advance whether the patent holder
would win at trial, reverse-payment agreements are presumptively unlawful unless the court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff would have won at trial.51

47 See text accompanying notes 42–43. See also generally Tom Engellenner, Comparison of Federal Court, ITC, and USPTO Proceedings in IP Disputes (American Intellectual
Property Law Association, Jan 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8E54-ED2G (detailing
the average cost of patent litigation).
48 See 15 USC §§ 1–2 (outlawing contracts and conspiracies in restraint of trade and
attempts to monopolize trade). See also 15 USC § 45(a) (granting the FTC the authority
to prevent all “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce”).
49 See generally, for example, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc v Biovail Corp International, 256 F3d 799 (DC Cir 2001); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F3d 896
(6th Cir 2003). The FTC was initially a plaintiff in the litigation underlying both of these
cases, but settled with the defendants via a consent decree. See Andrx, 256 F3d at 817
n 20. See also Consent Agreement Resolves Complaint against Pharmaceutical Companies
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. and Andrx Corp. (FTC, Apr 2, 2001), archived at
http://perma.cc/EK67-AB5S.
50 See, for example, FTC v Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 677 F3d 1298, 1312 (11th
Cir 2012).
51 See id. There are many reasons why the holder of a valid patent might settle in
spite of a well-justified belief that it would win at trial. These reasons include risk aversion, concern for negative publicity, and financial prudence (such as when the litigation
costs exceed the value of the lawsuit). Id at 1313.
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The federal appellate courts disagreed about the merits of the
FTC’s argument. Three circuit courts rejected the FTC’s argument outright, holding that reverse-payment agreements should
be “immune from antitrust attack so long as [their] anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of
the patent” because the Patent Act’s grant of monopoly power to
brand-name drug manufacturers shielded agreements concerning
that lawfully granted monopoly power from antitrust scrutiny.52
This held true regardless of whether the patent was subsequently
declared invalid. As the Eleventh Circuit put it, “even a court
judgment about a patent’s actual exclusionary power, unless that
judgment comes before settlement, does not count. What does
count is the patent’s ‘potential exclusionary power’ as it appeared
at the time of settlement.”53 At the time of the settlement, a patent
holder has apparent legal monopoly power—and that is what
matters.
Courts were also concerned about the implications of accepting the FTC’s argument. Some judges worried that applying antitrust scrutiny to reverse-payment agreements within the patent
term would require courts to adjudicate the likelihood of the patent holder’s success on the merits, as those merits stood at the
time of the settlement. Doing this would “require[ ] mining
through mountains of evidence” and essentially litigating the
very trial that the settlement was designed to avoid.54 This would
obviate the benefits of settlement, a consequence that the “legal
system can ill afford.”55 In addition to being expensive and difficult, after-the-fact estimates about the likelihood of success on the
merits are inherently tenuous: “Predicting the future is precarious at best; retroactively predicting from a past perspective a future that never occurred is even more perilous.”56 Many courts
thought it poor public policy to apply antitrust scrutiny, and the

52 Id at 1312. See also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544
F3d 1323, 1332–37 (Fed Cir 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F3d
187, 205–13 (2d Cir 2005).
53 Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F3d at 1308, quoting Valley Drug, 344 F3d at 1311.
54 Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F3d at 1314. See also In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466
F3d at 203–04.
55 Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F3d at 1314. See also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F3d at 1333 (“[T]here is a long-standing policy in the law in favor of settlements,
and this policy extends to patent infringement litigation.”).
56 Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F3d at 1313.
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treble damages often entailed by a finding of liability, to such a
“precarious” inquiry.57
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit went a step further, reasoning that subjecting reverse payments to antitrust
scrutiny would not only discourage settlements—which are, as a
general matter, extremely socially valuable58—but also discourage generic manufacturers from challenging the brand-name
manufacturer’s patent in the first place, because removing the
possibility of a reverse-payment settlement substantially decreases the expected value of suing.59 If reverse-payment settlements are permitted, the expected value of a patent challenge includes not only the expected value of winning, but also the
expected value of settlement. But if reverse payments are forbidden, generic challengers’ only hope of recovery is to win at trial—
a risky prospect. By discouraging patent challenges at the outset,
a prohibition on reverse payments could have the effect of reducing competition in the long run.60
Despite these concerns, some circuit courts took the opposite
stance and found reverse-payment agreements presumptively unlawful, at least when they involve cash consideration and an explicit promise by the generic to delay or prevent triggering of the
180-day exclusivity period.61 These courts rested this judgment on
the “common sense” observation that a “payment flowing from the
[monopolist] to the challenging generic firm” inherently suggests
an anticompetitive motive.62
The Supreme Court resolved the divide among lower courts in
2013, when it decided Actavis. In Actavis, the Supreme Court struck
a middle ground, holding in a 5–3 ruling63 that reverse-payment

57 Id. See also In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F3d at 228; In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F3d at 1333.
58 The judicial policy favoring settlements in patent cases is over a century old. See,
for example, Bement v National Harrow Co, 186 US 70, 93 (1902) (noting the efficiency
gains of settlement and emphasizing that the settlement of complex patent litigation, in
particular, is “a legitimate and desirable result in itself ”). For an analysis of the circumstances in which patent settlements involving cash consideration are uniquely socially valuable, see John E. Lopatka, A Comment on the Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payment Patent
Settlements: Through the Lens of the Hand Formula, 79 Tulane L Rev 235, 251–53 (2004).
59 See Asahi Glass Co v Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 289 F Supp 2d 986, 994 (ND
Ill 2003) (Posner sitting by designation).
60 See id.
61 See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F3d 197, 214–18 (3d Cir 2012); Andrx
Pharmaceuticals, 256 F3d at 807–12; In re Cardizem CD, 332 F3d at 907–09.
62 In re K-Dur, 686 F3d at 218.
63 Justice Samuel Alito did not take part in the decision. Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2226.
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agreements are subject to antitrust scrutiny.64 The fact that the
anticompetitive effects of a reverse payment might fall within the
monopoly power granted by a patent, the Court held, does not
immunize the agreement from antitrust scrutiny.65
The Court outlined “five sets of considerations” in support of
this conclusion.66 First, the Court determined that some reverse
payments have the “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition,” because they result in the extension of monopoly power
over some patents that would otherwise be invalidated.67 This extension of monopoly power can result in higher prices to consumers, often amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.68 Second,
the Court found that “these anticompetitive consequences will at
least sometimes prove unjustified” by “traditional settlement considerations, such as avoided litigation costs or fair value for services.”69 Third, “where a reverse payment threatens to work unjustified anticompetitive harm,” the patent holder usually
possesses enough market power “to bring that harm about in
practice.”70 Fourth, the Court determined that antitrust scrutiny
is administratively feasible, in part because “it is normally not
necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question,” given that “[a]n unexplained large reverse payment itself
would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts
about the patent’s survival,” and using a settlement payment “to
prevent the risk of competition” leads to “the relevant anticompetitive harm.”71 Finally, the Court emphasized that litigants
may still “settle in other ways” such as “by allowing the generic
manufacturer to enter the patentee’s market prior to the patent’s
expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to stay out
prior to that point.”72
For these reasons, the Court determined that reverse-payment
agreements are not immune from antitrust scrutiny. However, the
Court rejected the FTC’s argument that reverse-payment agreements should be deemed “presumptively unlawful.”73 Instead, it

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id at 2227.
Id at 2236.
Id at 2234.
Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2234.
Id.
Id at 2235–36.
Id at 2236.
Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236.
Id at 2237.
Id.
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held that courts must analyze these agreements under the “rule
of reason.”74 Rule-of-reason analysis requires the trier of fact to
conduct a thorough, searching evaluation of the facts of a case to
determine whether an agreement that restrains trade unreasonably suppresses competition, “taking into account a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business,
its conditions before and after the restraint was imposed, and the
restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”75
In the context of reverse-payment suits, the Court emphasized that determining whether a settlement violates antitrust
laws also requires a trier of fact to scrutinize the parties’ reasons
for settling: “If the basic reason is a desire to maintain and to
share patent-generated monopoly profits, then, in the absence of
some other justification, the antitrust laws are likely to forbid the
arrangement.”76 But reverse payments are not forbidden if they
are motivated by the parties’ desire to avoid litigation costs or
reputational harms, or to compensate the generic manufacturer
for counterclaims or services provided.77 Consequently, courts
should consider any (admissible) “evidence that the patentee
seeks to induce the generic challenger to abandon its claim with
a share of its monopoly profits that would otherwise be lost in the
competitive market.”78
C.

Open Questions and Evidentiary Obstacles

Despite announcing the legal status of reverse payments and
the level of scrutiny to be applied, Actavis left many questions
unanswered, several of which are important for the purposes of
this Comment.
First, Actavis emphasized that trial courts must examine
parties’ motivations for settling in order to determine liability,
but provided lower courts with no guidance on how to uncover
those motivations. As Part II of this Comment explains, many
federal courts have held that settlement communications—which
are likely to be the best, if not the only, direct evidence of parties’
motivations—are shielded by a nearly impenetrable privilege. Because the Supreme Court did not address how the Actavis framework interacts with settlement privilege, lower federal courts
74
75
76
77
78

Id.
State Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3, 10 (1997).
Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2237.
See id at 2235–36.
Id at 2235.
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that recognize settlement privilege are left between a rock and a
hard place. How should these courts reconcile their need for evidence in antitrust cases with a robust protection for settlement
communications? Must courts either roll back settlement privilege or else let some percentage of reverse-payment cases slip by
for lack of evidence?79
Second, it is not clear whether the validity of the patent underlying the reverse payment can operate as a defense to an antitrust claim. As discussed in Part III.A.2, the answer to this question impacts not only the ultimate finding of liability, but also the
ease with which courts can invoke the crime-fraud doctrine—an
evidentiary rule according to which no privilege attaches to communications undertaken in furtherance of a crime or fraud80—to
uncover the settlement communications that led to the reversepayment agreement. If the Court’s description of “the relevant anticompetitive harm” of reverse payments as relating to the patent
holder’s attempt to “prevent the risk” of its patent being invalidated81 is read literally, then it appears that even the holder of a
valid patent violates antitrust laws when it settles out of risk
aversion. But this logic would also seem to subject settlements
concerning early market entry—in which the generic manufacturer is not paid cash consideration, but is instead allowed to market its product before the patent holder’s patent has expired—to
antitrust scrutiny,82 a result that the Court expressly disclaimed.83
Third, it is not obvious how a court should proceed if it finds
that only one of the settling parties entered the reverse-payment
agreement for impermissible reasons. Presumably the party who
settled for anticompetitive reasons would be held liable, while the

79 At least one court has suggested that courts do, in fact, face this harsh, binary
choice. See In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litigation, Case No 1:12-md-02343, *3–
6 (ED Tenn July 29, 2014) (“Skelaxin Order”) (holding that settlement privilege must be
upheld even if it deprives reverse-payment plaintiffs of valuable or necessary evidence,
but noting that this result might mean that settlement privilege should be abandoned
entirely).
80 For a complete definition of the crime-fraud exception, see notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
81 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236.
82 See id at 2245 (Roberts dissenting) (“[T]his logic—that taking away any chance
that a patent will be invalidated is itself an antitrust problem—cannot possibly be limited
to reverse-payment agreements, or those that are ‘large.’”).
83 Id at 2237 (explaining that litigants may avoid antitrust scrutiny by “settl[ing] in
other ways,” such as “by allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee’s market
prior to the patent’s expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to stay out
prior to that point”).
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party who settled for innocent reasons likely could not.84 But, for
reasons discussed in Part III.A.2, it is likely impossible to invoke
the crime-fraud doctrine to uncover settlement communications
if only one party entered the settlement for unlawful reasons.
Part III suggests a way to resolve these ambiguities. But
first, Part II provides an overview of the origins, purpose, and
scope of settlement privilege.
II. FEDERAL SETTLEMENT PRIVILEGE
Rules governing privilege and discovery in federal cases are
outlined in both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and
the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE). The FRCP sketch the scope
of discovery, explaining that a party “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense,” but that this “information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”85 In other words,
privileged information is shielded from discovery. Nonprivileged
information is, in principle, discoverable so long as it is relevant,
but it is not necessarily admissible at trial,86 and in some circumstances courts may require the party seeking discovery to make a
heightened showing of need.87

84 One reason for this presumption is that most reverse-payment cases are brought
under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 38 Stat 717, 719–21 (1914),
codified as amended at 15 USC § 45, which, unlike § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 26
Stat 209, 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1, does not require an anticompetitive agreement between multiple parties (and can therefore be invoked against a single
actor acting by itself).
85 FRCP 26(b)(1).
86 For example, FRE 408 provides that evidence of an offer to settle a claim “is not
admissible . . . to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim,” but it
leaves open the possibility that these communications could be admitted for other purposes. Thus, even courts that do not recognize a federal settlement privilege would still
refuse to admit settlement communications into evidence for the purpose of establishing
liability or damages in the claim about which the settlement communications were made.
More generally, FRE 403 specifies that a court may refuse to admit “relevant evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.”
87 For example, attorney work product is not privileged, but is protected under FRCP
26(b)(3)(A)(ii), which requires that the party seeking to discover work product demonstrate
“substantial need” for the materials sought and show that it cannot obtain the same information through other means.

GOWEN_CMT_FLIP (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

9/20/2016 2:10 PM

Saving Federal Settlement Privilege after Actavis

1519

The FRE govern the privileges that federal courts apply in
federal question cases.88 When Congress first considered the proposed FRE in the 1970s, the proposed rules contained nine enumerated privileges.89 But disagreement about which privileges
should be recognized and what their scope should be was so widespread that Congress eventually erased the proposed privilege
rules and in their place passed FRE 501,90 which provides: “The
common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light
of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege unless any
of the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.”
When FRE 501 was enacted in 1975, there were a handful of
privileges widely recognized by federal courts, including marital
testimonial privilege, marital communicative privilege, attorneyclient privilege, and privileges for voting and state secrets.91 But rather than freeze these privileges as they existed in 1975, FRE 501
manifested Congress’s “affirmative intention . . . to provide the
courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a caseby-case basis, and to leave the door open to change.”92
In the first two decades following the enactment of FRE 501,
courts did not exercise their ability to create new privileges.93
This changed in 1996, when the Supreme Court decided Jaffee v
Redmond,94 creating a new “psychotherapist-patient” privilege in
the process.95 Jaffee marks the first and only time that the Supreme Court has exercised its authority under FRE 501 to recognize a privilege not already established in the common law.96 In
Jaffee, the Court found that four factors are especially relevant to
determining whether to recognize a new privilege. Those factors
are: (1) whether the asserted privilege is “rooted in the imperative
need for confidence and trust”; (2) whether the privilege would
88

In diversity cases, federal courts must apply state privilege law. See FRE 501.
See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 FRD 183, 234–
58 (1972). The proposed privilege rules were originally numbered Rules 502–10. Settlement privilege was not one of them. See id.
90 See Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 Am U L Rev 59, 87–93 (2002).
91 See Jeffrey J. Lauderdale, A New Trend in the Law of Privilege: The Federal Settlement Privilege and the Proper Use of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 for the Recognition
of New Privileges, 35 U Memphis L Rev 255, 260–61, 263–64 (2005).
92 Trammel v United States, 445 US 40, 47 (1980) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
93 See Lauderdale, 35 U Memphis L Rev at 276–79 (cited in note 91).
94 518 US 1 (1996).
95 Id at 15.
96 See Lauderdale, 35 U Memphis L Rev at 279–81 (cited in note 91).
89

GOWEN_CMT_FLIP (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE)

1520

The University of Chicago Law Review

9/20/2016 2:10 PM

[83:1505

further normatively desirable public policy ends; (3) whether the
evidentiary detriment caused by an exercise of the privilege is
“modest”; and (4) whether denial of the federal privilege would
frustrate a parallel privilege adopted by the states.97
In 2003, the Sixth Circuit became the first circuit court to follow the Supreme Court’s lead in Jaffee, using its FRE 501 authority to recognize another privilege not established in common law.
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co v Chiles Power Supply, Inc,98 the
Sixth Circuit determined that the Jaffee factors weigh in favor of
privileging communications made in furtherance of a settlement.99 Specifically, the court noted that: (1) confidentiality is imperative for effective settlement negotiations;100 (2) settlements
serve important public interests by benefiting both parties, dramatically reducing litigation costs, unburdening the court system,
and enhancing judicial efficiency;101 and (3) the evidentiary detriment caused by exercise of the privilege is minimal because settlement negotiations involve a great deal of “puffing,” hypothetical concessions, and similarly unreliable statements.102 The court
did not explicitly address the fourth Jaffee factor, but it did emphasize that settlements serve substantial state and federal interests, and that there is a “historical” tradition at both the state
and federal levels of protecting settlement negotiations in some
form.103
The Goodyear court noted that settlement communications
are already protected, in a limited way, by FRE 408,104 which prevents parties from using settlement communications to “prove or
disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim.”105 But the
court concluded that FRE 408 was seriously underprotective of
settlement communications because it “does not require exclusion

97

See Jaffee, 518 US at 10–13.
332 F3d 976 (6th Cir 2003).
99 See id at 979–82. Importantly, Goodyear did not hold that a settlement agreement
itself is privileged—only that communications made in furtherance of such an agreement
are privileged. Id at 981–82 (“[A]s with other privileges, the relationship itself is not privileged, but only the underlying communications.”).
100 Id at 980.
101 Id.
102 Goodyear, 332 F3d at 981, quoting Cook v Yellow Freight System, Inc, 132 FRD
548, 554 (ED Cal 1990).
103 See Goodyear, 332 F3d at 980–81.
104 Id at 979.
105 FRE 408(a). For example, if A sues B for $100,000 and B offers to settle the suit
for $80,000, A cannot use the settlement offer as evidence that her claim must be worth
at least $80,000.
98
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when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving
bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue
delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution.”106 The court was especially concerned that FRE 408
does not prevent “some future third party” from admitting settlement communications “on cross examination, under the ruse of
‘impeachment evidence’” or bias evidence, when the actual purpose and effect of such an admission is to prejudice the fact finder
against the settling party.107
The evidentiary “ruse” mentioned by the court frequently
arises in tort suits against product manufacturers,108 many of
which follow a similar pattern: Plaintiff A brings a product liability suit against Manufacturer; the parties settle on terms favorable to Plaintiff A; later, Plaintiff B sues Manufacturer for a
similar defect; at trial, Manufacturer’s witness testifies that
Plaintiff B’s suit lacks merit; Plaintiff B then admits into evidence the prior settlement negotiations, claiming that statements
in those negotiations show that the witness is “bias[ed] or prejudice[d].”109 Whether or not the settlement negotiations actually do
show the witness’s bias, admission of the unfavorable settlement
details is likely to prejudice the fact finder against Manufacturer.
This result deters parties from “propos[ing] the types of compromises that most effectively lead to settlement” in the first place,
with the end result being fewer settlements and an accompanying
loss of “judicial efficiency.”110
These policy arguments notwithstanding, the Sixth Circuit is
an outlier among its sister circuits. Only two other appellate
courts have considered whether to recognize federal settlement
privilege, and both declined to do so. The Seventh Circuit was the
first circuit court to consider the issue, in dictum, in the 1979 case
In re General Motors Corp Engine Interchange Litigation.111 In
that case, the Seventh Circuit summarily remarked in a footnote
that it found “no convincing basis for . . . [recognizing a settlement
privilege] here.”112 However, the issue of whether settlement communications should be privileged was not raised by the parties,
106 Goodyear, 332 F3d at 979, quoting FRE 408(b) (1975), amended Apr 12, 2006 (quotation marks omitted).
107 Goodyear, 332 F3d at 980.
108 See, for example, id.
109 FRE 408(b).
110 Goodyear, 332 F3d at 980.
111 594 F2d 1106 (7th Cir 1979).
112 Id at 1124 n 20.
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and—because Jaffee had not yet been decided—the Seventh Circuit did not have the benefit of examining the issue under the
Jaffee factors. More recently, the Federal Circuit categorically rejected the possibility of recognizing settlement privilege in In re
MSTG, Inc,113 concluding that the benefits of encouraging settlement are outweighed by the evidentiary deficit that could result
from shielding all settlement communications from discovery.114
Although the Sixth, Seventh, and Federal Circuits are the
only appellate courts to have explicitly considered the merits of
recognizing settlement privilege, many district courts have considered the issue, and they are divided. The Southern District of
California115 and Eastern District of California116 have employed
reasoning similar to that of the Goodyear decision in recognizing
a settlement privilege. Seven district courts have come out the
other way, usually in cursory opinions that cite the Federal Circuit’s analysis in In re MSTG.117 And at least one district court
has issued inconsistent opinions on the matter.118

113

675 F3d 1337 (Fed Cir 2012).
See id at 1342–48.
115 See California v Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, LP, 2010 WL 3988448, *3–4 (SD
Cal) (recognizing settlement privilege on public policy grounds).
116 See Cook, 132 FRD at 554 (“[W]hile it is true that Rule 408 is addressed to the
inadmissibility of evidence at trial . . . the same consideration of policy . . . also appl[ies]
to settlement [negotiations between the defendant and a third party].”).
117 See Spilker v Medtronic, Inc, 2014 WL 4760292, *3 (ED NC) (“[W]hen determining
whether a settlement agreement is producible in discovery . . . relevance, rather than admissibility, is the appropriate inquiry.”); ABT Systems, LLC v Emerson Electric Co, 2012
WL 6594996, *2 (ED Mo) (“The Eighth Circuit has not adopted a settlement negotiation
privilege and this Court agrees with the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the issue in In re
MSTG.”); Eisai Inc v Sanofi-Aventis US, LLC, 2011 WL 5416334, *7 (D NJ) (holding that
settlement negotiations are not privileged but that parties seeking to discover the contents
of these negotiations must make a heightened showing of relevance); In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 2009 WL 2058759, *3–4 (D Kan) (“[P]laintiffs have not met their burden
of establishing that a settlement privilege exists.”); Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior University v Tyco International Ltd, 253 FRD 521, 523 (CD Cal 2008) (noting that
there is no widespread acceptance of a federal settlement privilege and declining to recognize such a privilege); Phoenix Solutions Inc v Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 254 FRD 568, 585
(ND Cal 2008) (“The court finds no convincing basis for Phoenix’s proposition that its licensing negotiation communications are protected from discovery by a settlement privilege.”); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co v Mediatek, Inc, 2007 WL 963975, *6 (ND Cal);
In re Subpoena Issued to Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 370 F Supp 2d 201,
208–13 (DDC 2005).
118 Contrast Datatreasury Corp v Wells Fargo & Co, 2010 WL 903259, *2 (ED Tex)
(allowing discovery of litigation-related documents from previous lawsuits in a case in
which the parties did not raise the privilege), with Software Tree, LLC v Red Hat, Inc,
2010 WL 2788202, *4 (ED Tex) (holding that any communications made in furtherance of
settlement are privileged and hence cannot be discovered).
114
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In sum, 12 percent of federal trial courts in the United States
recognize settlement privilege,119 and more may do so in the future. As reverse-payment cases are litigated in these courts,
judges and parties will continue to confront difficult questions
about how to reconcile a principled protection of settlement communications with the evidentiary inquiry into the settling parties’
motivations that Actavis demands. Part III explores these questions in detail and proposes two possible solutions.
III. APPLICATION: SETTLEMENT PRIVILEGE IN THE CONTEXT OF
REVERSE-PAYMENT AGREEMENTS
Because a defendant’s liability in reverse-payment suits under Actavis hinges on the motivation and terms of the settlement
agreement,120 it is imperative for courts to determine whether
communications made in furtherance of those settlements are
shielded from discovery by a settlement privilege.
One district court in the Sixth Circuit, the Eastern District
of Tennessee, has confronted this issue in an ongoing antitrust
case, In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litigation.121 The
Skelaxin plaintiffs—three drug stores who brought suit under § 4
of the Clayton Act122—allege that the brand-name defendant and
generic-challenger defendant had entered into an anticompetitive
reverse-payment settlement that allowed the brand-name defendant to preserve its invalid patent over the muscle-relaxant
metaxalone (also known by its brand name, “Skelaxin”).123 According to the drug stores, the reverse payment injured their businesses by forcing them to pay “hundreds of millions of dollars

119 The nine district courts in the Sixth Circuit plus the two district courts discussed
above account for eleven of the ninety-four federal district courts in the United States.
120 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2235, 2237 (explaining that courts should consider “evidence
that the patentee seeks to induce the generic challenger to abandon its claim with a share
of its monopoly profits that would otherwise be lost in the competitive market” and stating
that “[i]f the basic reason is a desire to maintain and to share patent-generated monopoly
profits, then, in the absence of some other justification, the antitrust laws are likely to
forbid the arrangement”).
121 Case No 1:12-md-2343 (ED Tenn 2014).
122 38 Stat 730, 731 (1914), codified as amended at 15 USC § 15 (authorizing injured
private parties to sue “by reason of anything forbidden in the [federal] antitrust laws”).
123 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litigation, Case No 1:12-md-2343, *3 (ED Tenn filed Jan 4, 2013) (available on Westlaw at
2013 WL 146097).
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more” to obtain the drug than they would have paid under competitive conditions.124 The plaintiffs sought to discover the settlement communications in order to help prove their case. The court
recognized that the settlement communications would be “highly
probative” of the defendant’s liability, and expressed concern
about the wisdom of Goodyear’s creation of a settlement privilege
in light of Actavis.125
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that it did not have
authority to roll back the settlement privilege created in Goodyear
or “to reweigh the public policy considerations underlying” that decision.126 The district court therefore held that the settlement communications at issue were privileged—even though upholding such
a privilege “deprive[s] plaintiffs of valuable evidence.”127
Skelaxin is the first (and, so far, the only) case to grapple with
the application of settlement privilege in the context of a reversepayment suit. The court in that case was right to suggest that the
application of settlement privilege to reverse-payment communications makes little sense from a public policy perspective: it has
the effect of protecting all communications surrounding an agreement that is alleged to be unlawful, but whose unlawfulness can
only be determined through a detailed evaluation of the parties’
motivations and of the “context” in which the agreement took
place.128 But courts and litigants seeking discovery of reversepayment settlement communications have options for reaching
those documents that the Skelaxin court did not explore. These
options, detailed in this Part, could allow courts to access settlement communications in reverse-payment cases without abandoning their commitment to—or compromising the integrity of—
settlement privilege.
Part III.A explains how plaintiffs—whether federal antitrust
enforcers or private parties suing under the Clayton Act’s private
right of action129—can use the crime-fraud doctrine to pierce defendants’ settlement privilege in certain reverse-payment challenges. The crime-fraud doctrine has the advantage of being a
well-established rule of evidence that applies to nearly all—if not

124
125
126
127
128
129

Id.
Skelaxin Order at *3–5 (cited in note 79).
Id at *3–4.
Id at *5.
Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2237.
See 15 USC §§ 15–15a.
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all—recognized privileges.130 And it is likely to be quite successful
in a certain class of suits—suits in which there is strong prima
facie evidence that both parties to the reverse payment entered
into the settlement for anticompetitive reasons.131 However, the
crime-fraud doctrine is often difficult and expensive to invoke,
and there are many cases in which it is unlikely to be successful.
Part III.B suggests a simpler, more straightforward alternative to the crime-fraud doctrine. Namely, courts could invoke the
common-law “necessity exception” to find settlement privilege inapplicable when the settlement itself is the subject of a lawsuit.
The necessity exception is less well-established than the crimefraud doctrine—and so in some sense is a riskier litigation strategy—but there are powerful reasons for thinking that it applies
in the context of settlement privilege. Importantly, the necessity
exception, unlike the crime-fraud doctrine, is inexpensive for
plaintiffs to invoke, easy for judges to apply, and is not likely to
lead to inconsistent results across cases.
By pursuing one or both of these approaches, plaintiffs in
reverse-payment suits will likely be able to discover communications leading up to reverse-payment settlements, thereby enabling courts to comply with the mandate of Actavis and evaluate parties’ motivations in settling.
A.

The Crime-Fraud Limitation in the Context of ReversePayment Suits

The crime-fraud limitation132 on evidentiary privileges is a
common-law doctrine with roots in eighteenth-century English
130 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence; Evidentiary Privileges § 6.13.2(d) at 1167–68 (Aspen 2d ed 2010) (explaining that “[a]lthough
most of the published opinions” discuss the crime-fraud doctrine in terms of the attorneyclient privilege, apparently “all other professional privileges, including the psychotherapistpatient, general medical, and accountant-client privileges, are subject to the exception,”
as are “personal privileges such as the spousal privilege”). There has been some controversy as to whether the crime-fraud doctrine fully applies in the context of the priestpenitent privilege, but this controversy is “more apparent than real” because the priestpenitent privilege, as traditionally understood, cannot be invoked at all when a penitent
communicates with a religious leader for a “bad faith” purpose, such as furthering crime
or fraud. See id § 6.13.2(d) at 1167 n 151.
131 For example, postsettlement statements by executives—to associates, employees,
or one another—boasting that the settlement allows either company to maintain or share
monopoly profits would constitute strong prima facie evidence of anticompetitive intent.
132 Many courts and scholars refer to the crime-fraud doctrine as an “exception” to
privilege rather than as a “limitation” on privilege, but that terminology is somewhat misleading. The rationale underlying the crime-fraud doctrine is that privilege never attaches
in the first place to communications that are undertaken in furtherance of crime or fraud.
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jurisprudence.133 According to the crime-fraud doctrine, no privilege attaches to communications undertaken in furtherance of
crime, fraud, or similar misconduct.134
At first blush, it may seem inappropriate to apply the crimefraud doctrine to reverse-payment suits, most of which are neither criminal nor fraudulent in the strict sense of those terms.
But this intuition is incorrect for two reasons. First, even though
most reverse-payment suits are brought in a civil action—either
by FTC enforcers or by private parties—anticompetitive reverse
payments are also prohibited by the Sherman Act, which is a
criminal statute.135 Because the crime-fraud doctrine prevents
privilege from attaching to covered communications in the first
place, the doctrine is not confined to suits centered on the alleged
crime or fraud.136 In other words, once a communication has been
made in furtherance of a crime or fraud, any future litigant can
discover that communication and admit it as evidence at trial.137

See note 136 and accompanying text. Understood in this way, the crime-fraud doctrine is
a limitation on the scope of privilege, rather than a mechanism for admitting legitimately
privileged information. This distinction is of little practical importance, however, since it
is only after examining the supposedly privileged communications (and thereby piercing
any privilege that might exist) that courts can determine whether the crime-fraud doctrine
applies. See text accompanying notes 161–62.
133 See David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the AttorneyClient Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 NC L Rev 443, 446–50 (1986)
(tracing the origins of the crime-fraud doctrine to a 1743 English case).
134 Clark v United States, 289 US 1, 15 (1933).
135 See 15 USC §§ 1–2 (outlawing and defining criminal penalties for contracts and
conspiracies in restraint of trade and attempts to monopolize trade). See also Actavis, 133
S Ct at 2227, 2232–33 (noting that anticompetitive reverse payments—as defined by the
Court in that opinion—are prohibited by the Sherman Act in addition to the FTC Act).
136 See Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore § 6.13.2(d)(1) at 1184 (cited in note 130) (noting that “all [ ] courts” agree with this view).
137 Id (“If there is no privilege to begin with, it is immaterial whether the exception is
invoked in a prosecution for that crime or in another proceeding.”). For example, suppose
a plaintiff sues an auto manufacturer for wrongful death after her spouse dies in a car
crash. In gathering evidence for her suit, the plaintiff wants to access communications
about the crash that took place between the car’s manufacturer and its attorneys—communications that are subject to attorney-client privilege. The plaintiff can pierce attorneyclient privilege and access the communicative documents by making out a prima facie case
that the internal investigations included a plan to falsify evidence or testimony, even
though the underlying lawsuit is a civil tort claim and not a criminal perjury charge. See,
for example, Ake v General Motors Corp, 942 F Supp 869, 876 (WDNY 1996) (finding the
crime-fraud doctrine applicable on similar facts, though ultimately concluding that the
plaintiff did not meet her burden of proof in showing that a crime had occurred). For this
same reason, the crime-fraud doctrine could be invoked to forfeit the privilege surrounding
settlement communications made in furtherance of an antitrust violation, even if the underlying charge is brought in a civil context (such as § 5 of the FTC Act) rather than a
criminal one (such as § 1 of the Sherman Act).
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Second, every court to consider the issue has held that the crimefraud doctrine encompasses civil antitrust violations and similar
quasi-fraudulent business torts.138
But in order to invoke the crime-fraud doctrine, a litigant
must do more than simply allege that an antitrust violation occurred. To invoke the crime-fraud doctrine to pierce an evidentiary privilege, the party seeking discovery of privileged communications—in the reverse-payment case, the plaintiff or
prosecutor—must make a two-part showing.
First, the plaintiff must convince the court to undertake an
in camera (that is, private and confidential) review of the communicative documents being sought. This requires the plaintiff to
make a factual showing “adequate to support a good faith belief
by a reasonable person that in camera review of the materials
may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud
[doctrine] applies.”139 If the party seeking discovery makes this
threshold showing, the judge must exercise his discretion in deciding whether to conduct in camera review, “in light of the facts
and circumstances of the particular case,” including the length
and number of documents in question, their probative value, and
the likelihood that the crime-fraud doctrine will, in fact, apply.140
If this showing is not made, the inquiry ends and the plaintiff is
barred from discovering the documents.
Second, once the judge has examined the documents through
in camera review, the plaintiff must show that the documents establish a “prima facie case” of crime or fraud.141 Only the specific
documents found to be in furtherance of crime or fraud may be
admitted or relied upon at trial.142
Because anticompetitive restraints of trade violate the federal antitrust laws,143 the crime-fraud limitation applies to anticompetitive reverse-payment agreements. But this generalization
138 See In re Fresh Del Monte Pineapple Antitrust Litigation, 2007 WL 64189, *17
(SDNY) (collecting cases).
139 United States v Zolin, 491 US 554, 572 (1989) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
140 Id.
141 Clark, 289 US at 14. See also Zolin, 491 US at 563 n 7 (cautioning that the Clark
Court’s use of the phrase “prima facie case” does not necessarily mean that the defendant
is not allowed to present evidence rebutting the plaintiff’s showing).
142 See, for example, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 419 F3d 329, 343 (5th Cir 2005)
(explaining that the crime-fraud limitation “does not extend to all communications made
[between two parties] . . . but rather is limited to those communications and documents in
furtherance of the contemplated or ongoing criminal or fraudulent conduct”).
143 15 USC §§ 1, 45.
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is question-begging, since not all reverse-payment agreements are
anticompetitive. Because Actavis held that the legality of reversepayment agreements must be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis,144 litigants seeking to invoke this exception in reverse-payment
suits can expect to encounter fact-specific procedural and practical
hurdles. These difficulties are explored below.
1. Preliminary hurdles: ownership and waivability of
settlement privilege.
Although the crime-fraud limitation applies to every privilege, the precise contours of the crime-fraud doctrine vary depending on the nature of the privilege at issue and the function
that the privilege serves. Because settlement privilege is a relatively new doctrine, some of its features have not yet been defined
by federal courts. Nevertheless, these details will be highly relevant to litigants in reverse-payment cases (and other cases in
which settlement privilege is invoked).
One fundamental principle of privilege law is that a privilege
may be waived only by the person to whom it belongs.145 Different
types of privileges belong to different persons. For example, because attorney-client privilege exists to protect the interests of
the client, the privilege belongs to the client.146 For this reason,
only the client may waive the privilege.147 It therefore follows that
attorney-client privilege is forfeited under the crime-fraud doctrine only when the client seeks an attorney’s advice in order to
commit a crime, even if the attorney is unaware that her advice
is assisting in a criminal plan.148 In contrast, marital communicative privilege exists to protect open and honest communication in

144

See text accompanying notes 73–78.
Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham Jr, 24 Federal Practice and Procedure § 5507 at 577 (West 1986) (“[C]ommon law permits waiver only by a ‘holder’ of the
privilege.”) (citation omitted).
146 See Upjohn Co v United States, 449 US 383, 389 (1981); Trammel v United States,
445 US 40, 51 (1980) (noting that the privilege “rests on the need for the advocate and
counselor to know all that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking representation if the
professional mission is to be carried out”).
147 See In re United States, 590 F3d 1305, 1310 (Fed Cir 2009) (explaining that attorneyclient privilege “belongs to the client, who alone may waive it”).
148 See Zolin, 491 US at 563 (“It is the purpose of the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege to assure that the seal of secrecy between lawyer and client does
not extend to communications made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission
of a fraud or crime.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Imwinkelried, The New
Wigmore § 6.13.2(d)(1) at 1170 (cited in note 130).
145
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marriage,149 an interest held by both spouses. Because marital
communicative privilege serves both members of a married couple, waiver of the privilege typically requires the consent of both
spouses.150 Just as both spouses are required to disclaim the privilege in the case of explicit waiver, the crime-fraud limitation does
not dissolve marital privilege unless both spouses engaged in the
communication for the purpose of furthering a crime or fraud.151
Because settlement privilege protects the ability of all parties
to a lawsuit “to negotiate and settle a case,”152 the privilege almost
certainly attaches to each party, rather than to only one party.153
And because each party has a right to exercise privilege over settlement communications, waiver of the privilege requires the consent of each party. It therefore follows that privilege is waived
under the crime-fraud doctrine only if both parties undertake settlement communications for purposes of committing crime or
fraud. But this result limits the applicability of the crime-fraud
doctrine in the reverse-payment context, because occasionally
only one party—the patent holder—enters the agreement with
the forbidden purpose “to share patent-generated monopoly profits” and thereby “prevent the risk of competition.”154 The challenger may have entered the agreement for innocent reasons, including a belief that it was likely to lose the underlying litigation
(a motive that is anticompetitive when held by the patentee, but
competitively neutral when held by the challenger).155 In other

149 Wolfle v United States, 291 US 7, 14 (1934) (“The basis of the immunity given to
communications between husband and wife is the protection of marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the
disadvantages to the administration of justice which the privilege entails.”).
150 See Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham Jr, 25 Federal Practice and
Procedure § 5584 at 699 (West 1989).
151 See, for example, United States v Rakes, 136 F3d 1, 4 n 5 (1st Cir 1998) (“In federal
courts, the marital communications privilege typically is forfeited only where both husband and wife are jointly engaged in criminal activity [or fraud] or where the victim is the
other spouse or some other family member.”).
152 Goodyear, 332 F3d at 980.
153 At least one case has acknowledged in passing that settlement privilege belongs
to both parties, although the question has apparently not been litigated directly. See, for
example, Grupo Condumex, SA de CV v SPX Corp, 331 F Supp 2d 623, 629–30 (ND Ohio
2004) (finding that neither of the two parties to a settlement “waived their settlement
privilege”) (emphasis added).
154 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236–37.
155 See note 156. Note also that the generic challenger has a strong incentive to claim
this innocent motive because doing so allows it to avoid antitrust liability in the present
case and signals to other defendants in future cases that it is a “safe” party to settle with.
Antitrust enforcers who set out to refute this claimed motive face an uphill battle because,
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words, there are likely to be reverse-payment cases in which only
one party harbors the intent needed to trigger the crime-fraud
limitation.156 In these cases, the crime-fraud doctrine cannot be
invoked to forfeit the privilege.
2. The two-step analysis in reverse-payment suits.
If the plaintiff can overcome the ownership obstacle, it must
complete a two-part showing to demonstrate that the communications were actually undertaken in furtherance of an antitrust
violation.157 This showing entails its own procedural hurdles.
Recall that the first step of the crime-fraud showing requires
the moving party (in reverse-payment cases, the plaintiff) to present enough factual evidence to convince a reasonable trier of fact
that it is likely that the crime-fraud exception will apply.158 This
showing is not difficult in the reverse-payment context. To make
it past the first step, the plaintiff need convince a judge only that
it is reasonable to believe that (1) the reverse-payment settlement
might be an illegal restraint of trade, and (2) the communications
were made in furtherance of that settlement.159 The second showing is easily met because all settlement communications are, by
definition, “made in furtherance” of the settlement.160 The first

even if a litigant believes it is likely to lose a case at trial, a savvy litigant will likely avoid
spelling out its pessimism during negotiations.
156 This result stems from basic elements of the Supreme Court’s formulation of liability in Actavis. Namely, if antitrust liability really is predicated on the attempt to “prevent the risk of competition,” Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236, then it follows that entrance into
a settlement could be illegal for one party (the party whose motive is to benefit from suppression of competition) but legal for its counterpart (who is unaware of the anticompetitive effects). For example, suppose that—midway through patent litigation—the generic
manufacturer determines that the brand-name manufacturer’s drug patent is likely valid
after all, while the patent holder becomes convinced (perhaps on the basis of evidence yet
unavailable to the generic challenger) that it is not. The patent-holder proposes a reverse
payment to avoid losing its monopoly power, while the generic challenger accepts the
agreement for the simple and innocent reason that it believes it would lose the underlying
litigation. From the challenger’s perspective, the agreement poses no anticompetitive
harms (because the challenger believes that the monopoly will remain in place regardless
of whether or not it settles), and therefore the challenger—unlike the defendant patent
holder—would not be liable for violating federal antitrust law under a literal reading of
Actavis.
157 See text accompanying notes 139–41.
158 See Zolin, 491 US at 572.
159 See Mattenson v Baxter Healthcare Corp, 438 F3d 763, 768–69 (7th Cir 2006). The
party seeking to invoke the crime-fraud doctrine has wide latitude in making this threshold
showing and may rely on “any relevant evidence, lawfully obtained, that has not been adjudicated to be privileged.” Zolin, 491 US at 575.
160 Goodyear, 332 F3d at 983.
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showing is also easily met; it asks only whether a reasonable person could believe that the settlement agreement might be illegal.161 In reverse-payment cases, the subject of the crime-fraud inquiry is also the subject of the lawsuit, so the first showing will
be met any time a case has made it past the pleading stage—that
is, any time the plaintiff has presented “enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”162
Once the judge has examined the settlement communications, the plaintiff must show that these communications establish a “prima facie case” of an antitrust violation.163 Appellate
courts have struggled to characterize the exact quantum of proof
needed to establish a prima facie case,164 although all agree evidence must do more than raise mere suspicion of an antitrust violation. For example, the DC, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits
have held that the crime-fraud limitation may be invoked only if
the materials at issue constitute a showing that, if unrebutted,
would result in a finding of crime or fraud.165 The First, Second,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have been less stringent, defining a
prima facie case as a case in which there is probable cause to believe, based on the evidence, that the crime or fraud occurred.166
Under either standard, there are ambiguities about what a
prima facie case should look like in the reverse-payment context.
One source of confusion is that Actavis leaves some room for doubt
161

Zolin, 491 US at 572.
Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544, 556 (2007).
163 Clark, 289 US at 14.
164 See Zolin, 491 US at 563 n 7.
165 See In re Sealed Case, 107 F3d 46, 50 (DC Cir 1997) (“The government satisfies its
burden of proof if it offers evidence that if believed by the trier of fact would establish the
elements of an ongoing or imminent crime or fraud.”); United States v Doe, 429 F3d 450,
454 (3d Cir 2005) (“A prima facie showing requires evidence which, if believed by the factfinder, would be sufficient to support a finding that the elements of the crime-fraud [limitation] were met.”) (quotation marks omitted); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 401 F3d 247,
251 (4th Cir 2005) (“[Evidence] must be such as to subject the opposing party to the risk
of non-persuasion if the evidence as to the disputed fact is left unrebutted.”) (quotation
marks omitted); In re International Systems and Controls Corp Securities Litigation, 693
F2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir 1982).
166 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F3d 18, 22–23 & n 4 (1st Cir 2005) (requiring “a reasonable basis to believe that the [communications furthered] . . . a crime or
fraud,” which the court went on to define as “something less than a mathematical (more
likely than not) probability”); In re Richard Roe, Inc, 68 F3d 38, 40 (2d Cir 1995); In re
Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F2d 155, 165–66 (6th Cir 1986) (“[T]here are not practical differences between the probable cause standard and the prima facie standards formulated
in the circuits.”) (citations omitted); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F3d 377, 381 (9th
Cir 1996).
162
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about whether a patent’s validity can operate as a defense in the
underlying antitrust lawsuit.167 If a patent’s validity can operate
as a defense, almost no communications made in furtherance of
the settlement could make out a prima facie case of an antitrust
violation, at least when an apparently legitimate validity defense
is raised in the underlying lawsuit. Even a statement by the patent holder acknowledging poor probability of success on the merits would not raise a prima facie case of invalidity, since patent
validity is an objective inquiry determined by the courts.168 In
other words, a party’s opinion about the validity of its patent is
not directly relevant to a court’s analysis of the validity—unless,
of course, this opinion is based on evidence not in the record.
However, if validity is not a defense—if the only relevant legal question is whether the patent holder intended to restrain
trade by avoiding the chance of its patent being invalidated—then
the content of settlement negotiations is likely to be quite relevant. These communications may well reveal whether a patent
holder is motivated by uncertainty about its patent, or by other
legitimate factors like a desire to compensate the other party for
services provided169 or to avoid litigation costs, including the reputational harms and negative press attention that often accompany lawsuits.
A more basic problem has to do with the standard of liability
in reverse-payment cases. As discussed above, Actavis suggests
that the relevant anticompetitive harm results from the parties’ attempt to suppress the risk of competition.170 But imagine
a reverse-payment lawsuit in which it is ambiguous—based on
the evidence in the record—whether the motivation behind the
settlement was suppression of competition or something else. To
overcome its burden of proof, the plaintiff needs to access the settlement communications, which are shielded by privilege. In
167 The Supreme Court has suggested, without holding, that courts should take into
account defenses raised to the underlying claim when evaluating whether or not the moving party has made out a prima facie showing of crime or fraud. See note 141. As of the
time of writing, only one lower court has grappled with the issue. See Time Insurance Co
v AstraZeneca AB, 52 F Supp 3d 705, 710–12 (ED Pa 2014) (holding that when damages,
as opposed to injunctive relief, are sought parties may be required to litigate the validity
of a patent).
168 See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2239–40 (Roberts dissenting) (observing that patent validity is an objective inquiry).
169 For example, many patent settlements—including reverse payments—contain
provisions in which the challenger agrees to market or otherwise promote some of the
patentee’s products. See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2229.
170 Id at 2237.
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many circuits, the plaintiff can invoke the crime-fraud limitation
to access these communications only if it can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they were in furtherance of an antitrust violation. But whether the reverse payment amounts to an
antitrust violation depends on the motivations of the parties—
motivations that can be determined (in this hypothetical) only by
examining the settlement communications. This circularity could
thwart many plaintiffs,171 and it seems likely to arise in those
reverse-payment cases in which nonprivileged evidence about the
settling parties’ motives is either ambiguous or nonexistent.
***
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the crime-fraud doctrine can be invoked to forfeit settlement privilege in at least some
reverse-payment cases. But litigants seeking to uncover privileged communications will face a number of obstacles in applying
the doctrine, including (1) the potential dual ownership of the
privilege,172 (2) the patent-validity defense,173 and (3) the somewhat circular requirement inherent in the standard for liability,
which requires the introduction of nonprivileged evidence of anticompetitive intent before the exception can be invoked.174
B.

A Necessity Exception to Settlement Privilege

Although the crime-fraud doctrine will likely allow plaintiffs
to admit critical evidence in some reverse-payment cases, invoking the crime-fraud doctrine is costly, error prone, and time consuming––and plaintiffs will not always be able to meet the doctrine’s evidentiary requirements. This Section proposes an
alternative solution, which has the benefit of uniformly applying
to all reverse-payment suits: courts can invoke the common-law
“necessity doctrine” and hold settlement privilege inapplicable in
lawsuits in which the settlement itself is at issue.
Like the crime-fraud limitation, the necessity exception limits parties’ ability to claim evidentiary privilege in certain narrow
171 See, for example, Richard McMillan Jr, Mary Bram, and M. Brinkley Tappan, Solving the Procedural Quagmire for Testing Reverse Payment Settlements, 11 Minn J L Sci &
Tech 801, 823–26 (2010) (noting the possibility that prosecutors could invoke the crimefraud doctrine in reverse-payment prosecutions, but observing that procedural obstacles
would likely prevent the doctrine from applying in all but the most “exceptional case[s]”).
172 See text accompanying notes 146–56.
173 See text accompanying notes 167–68.
174 See text accompanying notes 170–71.
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circumstances. But unlike the crime-fraud doctrine, the necessity
exception to privilege is a straightforward, rule-like doctrine that
is easy for plaintiffs to invoke and equally easy for courts to administer. This Part discusses the important role that the necessity doctrine has played in other areas of evidence law—most importantly attorney-client privilege—and then analyzes how that
doctrine would apply in the settlement privilege context. This
Part concludes that litigants can invoke the necessity exception
to settlement privilege in any case in which the legality of the
settlement itself is at issue. Reverse-payment cases plainly fall
into this category: in reverse-payment lawsuits, the legality of the
settlement agreement is precisely the legal question that courts
must adjudicate.
1. Origins and applications of the necessity exception.
The so-called necessity exception has deep common-law
roots.175 It limits privilege in a narrow, clearly defined set of cases.
In this sense, it operates similarly to the crime-fraud doctrine.
But while the crime-fraud limitation prevents privilege from attaching to communications that are undertaken in furtherance of
illegal activity, the necessity exception allows privilege to be overcome when the privileged communications—or the relationship at
the heart of those communications—are themselves the subject of
litigation.
Although the necessity exception has never been invoked in
a settlement privilege case, it has long played an important role
in limiting other forms of privilege—most notably, marital communicative privilege, spousal testimonial privilege, and attorneyclient privilege.176 In the case of marital communications, the exception is as old as the privilege itself; for centuries, courts have
invoked the necessity doctrine to allow victim-spouses to testify
175 See James Calhoun Johnson, Note, Evidence—Husband and Wife—Admission in
Evidence—Victim-Wife’s Testimony May Be Compelled in Prosecution of Husband for
Mann Act Violation, 39 Tex L Rev 508, 510 & n 11 (1961) (tracing the origin of the necessity exception to the 1631 trial of Lord Audley, in which the English Privy Council recognized the right of an injured wife to testify against her husband, despite the usual rule
deeming spouses incompetent to testify for or against one another). See also Lord Audley’s
Case, 123 Eng Rep 1140, 1141 (CP 1631).
176 In the context of attorney-client privilege, courts and commentators usually do not
use the “necessity exception” terminology. Instead, they tend to use ad hoc language, such
as “joint-client exception” or “wrongful discharge exception.” See note 185. But the rationale for these exceptions in attorney-client privilege cases is identical to the core rationale underlying the necessity exception in spousal privilege cases. See text accompanying notes 185–87.
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against defendant-spouses in domestic violence cases, thereby
breaching the defendant-spouse’s communication privilege.177
Courts have also invoked the necessity exception to compel unwilling victim-spouses to testify in domestic violence and sexcrime prosecutions, thereby breaching the victim-spouse’s testimonial privilege.178
Courts justify these necessity exceptions in many ways,
sometimes without formal reference to the necessity exception at
all.179 Some judges analogize the necessity exception (often referring to it as “[t]he public policy exception”) to the crime-fraud limitation and describe the defendant-spouse as “waiving” his privilege when he commits a crime against his wife or against the
couple’s children.180 But this justification is unsatisfying both because it is circular (it assumes, without requiring any kind of
prima facie showing, that the defendant actually did commit a
crime against his wife) and because it does not explain those cases
in which the victim-spouse, who is not alleged to have done anything wrong, is compelled to forfeit her own spousal privilege by
being made to testify against her husband.
Other judges justify this breach of privilege by reasoning that
the act of committing a crime against one’s spouse vitiates marital privilege entirely because it destroys “the deep bond of trust
and love between marital partners and disrupts family harmony,”
the very features of marriage that the privilege was designed to
protect.181 This explanation solves the victim-spouse problem—
marital privilege is destroyed altogether, because the defendantspouse has irreparably harmed the couple’s marital interests—
but not the circularity problem.
The most cogent justification offered by judges—an explanation that solves both the victim-spouse problem and the circularity problem—is a pragmatic one: marital privilege must be forfeited when one spouse is prosecuted or sued for harming the
other, because if it were not then many intramarital crimes or

177

See note 175.
See Johnson, Note, 39 Tex L Rev at 510–12 (cited in note 175) (collecting cases).
179 See Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore § 6.13.5(a) at 1230 (cited in note 130) (noting
that the “necessity exception” label is not the only moniker for the exception, and that
courts have not always explicitly acknowledged it as a formal exception).
180 United States v Bahe, 128 F3d 1440, 1445, 1446 (10th Cir 1997).
181 United States v Breton, 740 F3d 1, 11 (1st Cir 2014). See also Bahe, 128 F3d at
1446 (“It would be unconscionable to permit a privilege grounded on promoting communications of trust and love between marriage partners to prevent a properly outraged spouse
with knowledge from testifying against the perpetrator of such a crime.”).
178
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torts could not be litigated at all.182 It is this rationale that gives
the necessity doctrine its name.183 It could be objected that if privilege can be overcome whenever the plaintiff’s case cannot succeed without accessing the privileged materials, then privilege
does not exist in any meaningful sense. This argument misses the
point: courts breach privilege in necessity cases not because any
single, individual case depends on it, but because an entire class
of cases—for example, spousal domestic violence cases—depends
on it. These cases, as a class, would systematically suffer from
(often fatal) evidentiary deficiencies if courts left spousal privilege
intact. It is this feature—the unprosecutability of an entire set of
cases, defined at a high level of generality—that gives meaningful
content to the necessity doctrine.
The necessity doctrine is not limited to spousal privilege. A
similar doctrine and justification have also emerged in the context
of attorney-client privilege. Even though attorney-client privilege
is the oldest and most carefully guarded evidentiary privilege,184 it
can be pierced for pragmatic reasons in limited circumstances. For
example, courts allow the privilege to be breached in cases in
which the services of a lawyer were obtained jointly on behalf of
several clients and litigation later arises between those same clients (as often happens when one defendant realizes, in the course
of jointly consulting an attorney, that his codefendants’ actions injured him as well as the plaintiff).185 Although judges and academics have not described the joint-client exception to attorney-client
182 See, for example, Breton, 740 F3d at 11 (recognizing an exception to marital privilege in cases in which one spouse harms the couple’s children because “child abuse occurs
most often in the home at the hands of a parent” and absent such an exception it would be
too difficult to prosecute child abuse cases as a class); Johnson v United States, 616 A2d
1216, 1222 (DC 1992) (explaining that, absent the necessity exception, the defendantspouse would have “complete immunity” from prosecution so long as he or she engaged in
the abuse “in secret”) (quotation marks omitted).
183 See Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore § 6.13.5 at 1230 (cited in note 130).
184 Upjohn, 449 US at 389.
185 See Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore § 6.13.2(b) at 1157–60 (cited in note 130)
(explaining the scope of the joint-client exception and collecting cases). Attorney-client
privilege also does not apply in cases in which a client sues her attorney for malpractice,
id § 6.13.2(a) at 1142, but malpractice suits are an example of waiving a privilege (because
the privilege belongs to the client who is electing to bring suit), not a genuine exception to
privilege. Suits between coclients involve a genuine exception to privilege, rather than a
waiver, because a defendant-client’s privilege is breached in these suits even when the
defendant-client does not want the lawsuit to continue, and even when there is no prima
facie evidence that the defendant-client engaged in any wrongdoing. See id § 6.13.2(b) at
1157–60. Another example of a genuine exception to attorney-client privilege occurs in
wrongful-discharge suits brought by an in-house attorney against her former employerclient. Several courts have recognized something like a “necessity exception” in this class
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privilege as an example of the “necessity” doctrine,186 it serves the
same role and has similar justifications.187 Namely, the joint-client
exception allows discovery of otherwise-privileged communications in a certain class of cases (suits between coclients, in their
capacity as coclients) that would, in the absence of such an exception, often be impossible to litigate.
2. Applying the necessity doctrine in the reverse-payment
context.
The same reasoning that justifies necessity exceptions to
attorney-client privilege and to marital privilege applies with
equal force to settlement privilege. As Skelaxin illustrates—and
as the judge in that case observed188—upholding settlement privilege in reverse-payment suits creates systematic evidentiary deficiencies in this class of cases. Consequently, just as the necessity
doctrine allows courts to breach spousal privilege when one
spouse commits a crime against the other, and to breach attorneyclient privilege when one coclient sues another, the necessity doctrine likely also allows courts to breach settlement privilege when
the settlement itself is the subject of civil litigation or a criminal
prosecution.
One possible formulation of the necessity limitation, as applied to settlement privilege, runs as follows: in order to invoke
necessity in the settlement-privilege context, the plaintiff’s claim
must necessarily challenge the legality or validity of settlement
terms to which the defendant was a party. This formulation covers
a small but important handful of cases, such as reverse-payment
suits, in which the plaintiff is required to prove the illegality of a
settlement in order to prevail. It would also include traditional

of cases, reasoning that without an exception, wrongful-discharge suits would be difficult
or impossible to litigate. See id § 6.13.2(a) at 1143 n 40 (collecting cases).
186 See Wright and Graham, 24 Federal Practice and Procedure § 5505 at 549 (cited
in note 145) (explaining that this exception is often “justified by the intent of the joint
parties who are supposed to have intended confidentiality as against others but not between themselves,” but that others criticize this justification as “fictional and beside the
point” because it is not accurate in many cases and because admitting the communications
into the record of a court case makes the privileged communications available to the world,
not just to the coclients).
187 See id.
188 See Skelaxin Order at *3, 5 (cited in note 79) (noting that settlement documents
are likely to be “highly probative of [defendants’] liability” in reverse-payment cases and
that successful invocation of settlement privilege in reverse-payment cases would necessarily “deprive plaintiffs of valuable evidence”).
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breach-of-settlement contract disputes.189 But under this formulation, settlement privilege could not be breached in lawsuits that
do not necessarily challenge the legality or meaning of settlement
terms—such as tort suits, prejudice hearings, or third-party litigation190—which are precisely the kinds of situations the settlement privilege was designed to cover.191
Although evaluating the general policy merits of federal settlement privilege is beyond the scope of this Comment,192 a settlement privilege with a necessity exception is far more conducive
to sound public policy—as defined by the Supreme Court’s fourfactor Jaffee test—than a settlement privilege without such an
exception. First, the necessity exception allows discovery only in
a small handful of cases, and these are not the cases in which
parties’ “need for confidence and trust”193 is greatest.194 Parties
need confidence and trust when negotiating a settlement because
of the risk that their adversary or “some future third party” could
189 For an example of such a case, consider the following hypothetical. Dave and Paul,
divorcing spouses, enter into a settlement agreement according to which “Paul retains
possession of the couple’s physical assets, except that Dave must transfer title of all jointly
owned motor vehicles to Paul.” Following the divorce, Dave retains possession of the couple’s jointly owned motorboat. Paul sues Dave for breach of contract, arguing that the
settlement’s reference to “motor vehicles” includes the couple’s motorboat. Suppose that
parol evidence located in Dave and Paul’s settlement communications vindicates Paul’s
interpretation. Under the crime-fraud doctrine, Paul could not enter these presettlement
documents into the court record, because the documents were not drafted in furtherance
of a crime or fraud. However, if the court construed the settlement privilege as inapplicable in situations in which the settlement itself is at issue, the court would allow Paul access
to the settlement communications because the underlying suit concerns the terms of the
settlement contract.
190 Used in this context, “third-party litigation” describes lawsuits to which none of
the settlement signers is a party. For example, many patent infringement suits require
courts to estimate reasonable licensing fees for the patent. Settlement licensing agreements entered into by other parties (but for similar patents) can indicate whether a specific
licensing fee is reasonable or not. For an example, see In re MSTG, 675 F3d at 1339–41.
191 See Goodyear, 332 F3d at 980 (justifying the Sixth Circuit’s recognition of settlement privilege by explaining that “[p]arties are unlikely to propose the types of compromises that most effectively lead to settlement unless they are confident that their proposed
solutions cannot be used on cross examination, under the ruse of ‘impeachment evidence,’
by some future third party”) (emphasis added). See also text accompanying notes 105–10.
192 For a broad evaluation of the jurisprudential and policy goals served by settlement
privilege, see generally Andrew Sher, FRCP 26 vs. FRE 408: Why Settlement Negotiations
Should Be Privileged against Third-Party Discovery, 16 Cardozo J Conflict Resol 295
(2014) (arguing that courts should recognize a settlement negotiation privilege to reduce
administrative costs and that the Jaffee factors weigh in favor of recognizing such a privilege); Lauderdale, 35 U Memphis L Rev 255 (cited in note 91) (concluding that the Sixth
Circuit’s creation of a federal settlement privilege represents smart public policy in addition to being proper under FRE 501).
193 Jaffee, 518 US at 10.
194 See text accompanying notes 105–10. See also notes 190–91 and accompanying text.
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admit settlement communications “on cross examination, under
the ruse of ‘impeachment evidence,’” when the actual purpose and
effect of such an admission would be to prejudice the fact finder
against the settling party.195 The risk that settlement documents
will unduly prejudice a judge or jury is high in suits that center
on factual allegations similar to the allegations that inspired the
settlement negotiations.196 But there is little risk of undue prejudice—which, by definition, implicates concerns that are ancillary
to the facts or issues of a case197—when the direct object of the suit
is the settlement itself.
Second, the inclusion of the necessity exception significantly
expands the public policy interests served by the settlement privilege. Without a necessity exception, courts would be unable to
make appropriately informed judgments in an entire class of
cases—reverse-payment cases—that the Supreme Court has
judged to have great social and economic significance.198 Nor
would courts be able to adjudicate ordinary breach-of-contract
cases that arise from disputes regarding ambiguous contractual
language within a settlement.199 On the other hand, recognition
of a necessity exception allows courts to avoid these problematic
results without compromising the public policy aims that settlement privilege was designed to protect.
Third, and relatedly, the existence of a necessity exception for
settlement privilege minimizes the evidentiary detriment caused
by the privilege.200 Fourth, adopting the necessity doctrine for settlement privilege brings federal law into more, rather than less,

195

Goodyear, 332 F3d at 980.
Product liability actions are a classic example of suits in which this risk is especially high. See text accompanying notes 109–10.
197 Black’s Law Dictionary 1370 (West 10th ed 2014) (describing undue prejudice as
the “harm resulting from a fact-trier’s being exposed to evidence that . . . so arouses the
emotions that calm and logical reasoning is abandoned”).
198 See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2227–30 (describing the millions of dollars in profits and
consumer welfare at stake in these cases). It could be argued that recognizing a necessity
exception contravenes sound public policy because doing so gives parties an incentive to
misrepresent their intentions in settlement discussions, thereby “planting” evidence that
distracts or misleads courts. To the extent that such an incentive exists, however, it operates with just as much force in a world without a necessity exception. Because parties can
waive settlement privilege, parties could manufacture innocent reasons for settling, incorporate those reasons into their settlement communications, and then admit those manufactured communications by waiving their privilege.
199 See note 189 and accompanying text.
200 For a discussion of the kinds of evidence allowed by the necessity doctrine that
would otherwise be privileged, see Part III.B.1.
196

GOWEN_CMT_FLIP (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE)

1540

9/20/2016 2:10 PM

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:1505

conformity with state law. Most states protect settlement communications in some form, but no states shield settlement discussions from discovery or admissibility in cases in which the
settlement itself is challenged.201
For these reasons, a necessity exception to settlement privilege strengthens the evidentiary and antitrust jurisprudence of
those courts that currently recognize such a privilege. It also
makes implementation of settlement privilege more feasible for
those courts that have not yet decided whether to recognize settlement privilege.
***
Despite the superficial similarities between the necessity exception and the crime-fraud limitation, the necessity doctrine has
a different rationale and produces different results than the
crime-fraud limitation. Specifically, the crime-fraud limitation allows discovery only when the moving party makes out a prima
facie case that both parties undertook the settlement communications in furtherance of a criminal or fraudulent act. It does not
allow discovery in ordinary breach-of-contract or other civil disputes centered on a settlement agreement. Nor does it allow discovery in reverse-payment cases in which the plaintiff cannot
gather enough nonprivileged evidence to make out a prima facie
showing of crime or fraud, or in which the plaintiff can do this only
with respect to one party, rather than both. The necessity exception, in contrast, applies across the board; it does not require courts
or litigants to make the costly, difficult, and time-consuming determinations necessary to invoke the crime-fraud limitation.
CONCLUSION
The Eastern District of Tennessee suggested in Skelaxin that
federal settlement privilege appears to be fundamentally incompatible with the Supreme Court’s reverse-payment jurisprudence.
At first blush, this conclusion seems unavoidable. Actavis instructs courts to examine the motivations behind reverse-payment
settlements, and settlement privilege shields from discovery the
most valuable evidence of parties’ motivations. But such a result
is not inevitable. Specifically, litigants in reverse-payment cases
may invoke the crime-fraud doctrine or, more promisingly, the
201 See In re MSTG, 675 F3d at 1343 (observing that no state legislature has enacted
settlement privilege).
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necessity exception, to uncover otherwise-privileged settlement
communications in reverse-payment cases. This result allows
those courts that have recognized a federal settlement privilege
to fully retain that privilege without undermining their antitrust
jurisprudence.

